

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SOURCE:

A national meeting ("ativo") of secretaries of organization of State Committees of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) was held in Rio de Janeiro from 27 October to 1 November 1953 to review the progress of the Stalin Recruitment Plan and to outline future steps to be taken to bring it to completion. Also attending this meeting were the organization secretaries of the Enterprise Committees of the Central do Brasil Railroad; the Light, Power and Tramway Company of Rio de Janeiro; the Public Employees' Union of the Federal District; the Companhia America Fabril; and the organization secretary of the Enterprise Cell of the Standard Electric Company. This meeting was presided over by Diogenes de Arruda Camara, organization secretary of the National Committee of the PCB.

The following is a set of notes containing statements made at the meeting by Diogenes de Arruda Camara:

SCHEME OF CONTROL OF THE STALIN RECRUITMENT PLAN

The second national meeting to organize the control of the Stalin Recruitment Plan was very positive. Many experiences were discussed, some positive and others negative. Once these experiences are generalized, they should be spread rapidly throughout the Party in a simple and accessible manner.

What is a reasonable generalization of these experiences? Such a generalization should take into account the typical facts of Party life: those which are not the most common, but those which press most acutely on the life of the Party; those which are born, and those which die; the new and the old.

What are the conclusions which should be reached as a result of our meeting:

First Conclusion

It may be observed that virtually nothing has been done to correct the

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weaknesses pointed out in the first national meeting to organize the control of the Stalin Recruitment Plan suggested by the Executive Commission of the National Committee. We met and we discussed a great deal, but virtually everything continued as before. Few units put into execution the measures and the advice given by the national directorate, and for this reason we are not fulfilling our quotas. Everything possible and necessary in the execution of the Stalin Recruitment Plan has not been done.

Second Conclusion

The rate of growth of the Party is not uniform but is decreasing. We should have achieved 70% of the quota of the Stalin recruitment, but we have achieved only 41% nationally. The Metropolitan Committee, which has a large quota, has not yet reached 50% fulfillment. In many important municipalities with large concentrations of workers the rate of growth is very low. In Sao Paulo in spite of great recruitment efforts, we have reached only 35% of our goal. The most serious thing about this is that the rate of growth is diminishing in the large enterprises. In the Federal District recruitment has dropped off from 100% achievement in the large companies during April, May and June to 14% in July and September. We should examine in every Party unit the causes of the decrease in the rate of recruitment.¹

This decrease is not normal in the life of our Party, principally when we are carrying out a campaign of recruitment. The Party should always grow and should always recruit.

Experience shows us that this growth is always in proportion to the amount of help given by the higher units to the lower units and in proportion to the control exercised over the units of the Party with respect to the task of recruitment.

The capital of Sao Paulo had done little recruiting before being invited to this meeting. The campaign was bogging down in that State. When they felt that they had to render an accounting on the plan, however, they mobilized themselves and recruited many new members for the Party. Little has been done to recruit women, youths, and rural dwellers in the present recruitment campaign.

Third Conclusion

The doors of the Party still are not open to the working class. Recruitments are made almost always from persons already known, already matured, already sympathizers. There are almost no examples of recruitment outside the spheres of influence of the Party. We must not publish our newspapers only with the idea of distributing them among the great masses but also with the idea of preparing the necessary conditions for recruitment.

There is a lack of audacity in the recruitment which is due to our failure to combat foreign tendencies in the Party, principally sectarianism. The bad examples of the comrades of Recife, Minas Gerais, and of the Light Company in the Federal District are evidences of this. The Party has great prestige in the Light Company of the Federal District. This may be seen in its quota of Cr\$ 208,000, with every favorable condition for it to be collected and even surpassed.² Nonetheless, recruitment in the Light Company is far from taking advantage of the present possibilities in that organization.

The Zone Committee of Aracatuba in Sao Paulo is an opposite example. The Party there is being built into a mass movement; it is being closely associated with the masses. In turn, this mass movement stimulates the Party itself. Another example is that of the Maritime Zone Committee, which is very sectarian and has not taken advantage of the exceptional conditions created by the recent strikes for recruitment en masse. Only 42 % of its quota has been attained. We do not utilize the delegates who have been to the Soviet Union to create propaganda about the Soviet Union and about Socialism, which represents an important inducement for new recruits.

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These delegates could say convincingly to the working class what they observed and felt in the Soviet Union, where the age-old dream of humanity in search of happiness and the predictions of the founders of scientific Socialism have become a reality. The happy people of the U.S.S.R. have ended the exploitation of man by man; the working class lives much better without the capitalists.

Fourth Conclusion

Too little attention is being given to consolidating the new recruits into Party cells. For example, we recruited 150 new members among the textile workers during the recent strikes, but only 10 of them have actually been brought into the Party. This explains the small number of rapid courses that are being given in Party units, the lack of study circles in the cells of the Party, the deficiency which is observed in cell meetings, and the great number of Communists who have not done any recruiting. We are not recruiting and consolidating the new members simultaneously.

Recruitment should be carried out by the cells themselves because it is only in that way that all cell members will carry out the task of recruitment efficiently. This fact is shown by the example of Standard Electric Company.

All new recruits should either be compelled to meet in the cell which recruited them until a new cell is formed, or should be transferred to another enterprise cell or neighborhood cell. Communists should never be permitted to remain outside of a cell and without Party tasks. A Communist not in a cell is like a fish out of water; he dies.

Fifth Conclusion

There is little concern with consolidating the cells of the Party. Because of this, little attention is given to the daily problems of the cell. No effort is made to educate, to aid politically, and to control the cell secretaries. The cells, and principally the enterprise cells, are not taught how to play their role of the vanguard. There is much confusion between the role of the cells or the leaders of the working class, and the role of the union councils or salary commissions in the enterprises.

The National Textile Conference, which was held recently, revealed serious cases of the underestimation of the Party cells. Cell meetings have been held with the attendance of 3, 4, 5, or 6 cell members of a cell having 10, 15, 20, or more members. Examples: the Bangu and Carioca factory cell meetings were attended by 4 and 6 members respectively.

The enterprise cells do not meet frequently enough because of lack of attendance of representatives from the higher units. Months have passed without meetings. The Metropolitan Committee habitually fails to contact the enterprise cells. For this reason it does not have a clear picture of their condition and does not help them as it should. There are numerous examples of this. The Bonsucesso District Committee has not given aid to the enterprise cells. Not even the Metropolitan Committee demands with sufficient energy that the District Committees really concentrate on the large enterprises. The same should be said with respect to the District Committees of the Zona Norte, of Meier, and of the Zona Sul, which do not help the enterprise cells to get out their factory poster news sheets. In the Federal District the enterprise newspapers are edited largely by intellectuals who are not connected with the enterprises. Factories such as Standard, Cruzeiro, Bangu, and Nova America do not have enterprise newspapers. The Sector newspapers, such as O Rolo of the textile workers, the newspaper of the metallurgical workers, and others, are not published regularly.

The neglect of the cells of the large enterprises is very great. The contest stimulated by the Executive Commission of the National Committee is not being taken advantage of. The Executive Commission established the following:

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The cell of an enterprise of more than 5,000 workers obtaining the most recruits will be allowed to have its entire secretariat attend a course of the National Committee;

The political secretary of an enterprise cell of an establishment of more than 5,000 workers who recruits the most will be given a trip to the Soviet Union next 1 May;

The cell political secretary of an enterprise of more than 5,000 workers who places second in the recruitment campaign will be awarded a gold watch, trademark Pobieda (Soviet), worth twelve thousand cruzeiros.

The comrades of the Central do Brasil Railroad, of the Federal District, and of the Prefecture of the Federal District have not yet been awakened to the recruitment. We come and we go, but those groups do not recruit. The Metropolitan Committee, for its part, does not aid them and is not taking the necessary measures for the recruitment.

Sixth Conclusion

The work of the Party still is being done by a few active members and there is no concern with incorporating all the members into Party work. This is the reason for the complaints and laments that the tasks are too many. This happens because the laws of the Party are not respected, particularly the supreme principle of leadership: collective leadership.

That is why the assistentes³ are everything in the cells; they do and undo, and the cells are not heard. It is for that reason that there is so much confusion between cell meetings and cell assemblies. The majority of Party members are not stimulated to participate in the active life of the cells, and with this comes the lowering of the role of the Party as an organization of the masses.

Seventh Conclusion

The Party's method of operating is bureaucratic and formal. The cells of the Party are not contacted frequently. The tasks are not given to the bases in a clear manner so that the tasks may not be superior to the capacity of each group. The tasks are distributed mechanically to all units with no distinction between the peculiarities of each and the way in which each acts. Formalism is expressed in the hurried generalization without foundation. What is right for one given group may not be for another; what was right yesterday may not be today; what is correct today may not be tomorrow. Therefore, it is necessary to end bureaucracy and formalism in the Party units.

Eighth Conclusion

We still do not understand that the completion of the tasks of the Party is a law of the Party, always demanding much force and much energy. Many times we start and then stop with the first difficulties encountered in the execution of the tasks. We must combat this. Victory in our tasks does not come by itself, but is won in daily struggle. That is, for example, what is happening with the Campaign of Signatures of the Brazilian People in Homage to the Great Stalin, which is not being pressed continuously. This is also the case with the Metropolitan Committee which during a long period ceased its attendance at the Naval Arsenal (Enterprise Cell), which up to now has not carried out one recruitment.

If we do not understand this, we shall stop with the first difficulties encountered in executing the Stalin Recruitment Plan, which should be considered by all of us as a question of honor. The tasks of the Reconstruction Plan and all the other tasks of the Party must not be forgotten. In order to execute them we have to get out of our lethargy. We must extirpate in all Party groups the remains of spontaneity, which makes difficult the advance of our work.

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Ninth Conclusion

There is little speed in combatting the deficiencies in the errors of the work of the Party. In the face of these difficulties, we try to wash our hands like Pilate. We write vainglorious eulogies to ourselves on the tasks already accomplished. In many committees of the Party difficulties are found but not combatted. We do not learn from the lessons of other struggles, nor do we take measures to place ourselves at the height of the new struggles which are opening. Why does this happen? Because criticism and auto-criticism still do not circulate freely in all Party groups. Some comrades here did well to criticize State directorates and even the National Committee itself. The comrade from the Light Company acted very well in criticizing his own committee. These criticisms are just and necessary. Criticism within the bases is being initiated, although timidly. It is lamentable that the editors of the Voz Operaria did not understand and reacted wrongly to the criticism of the comrades of the Light Company of Sao Paulo. We must understand that the voice of the cells is the voice of the Party itself. It is with criticism and auto-criticism that we shall end the weaknesses in our work, and end the self-sufficiency of the majority of the directors of our Party. It is necessary to stimulate auto-criticism and criticism more, in order to start a fight against placidness and complacency, which are found in many Party groups. The cadres should be educated on the basis of criticism and auto-criticism of their own errors.

Tenth Conclusion

Party experiences still are not known generally, and they should be the patrimony of all the Party. Reports are made which are dry, without life, unconnected with reality. Written reports are made, but uncollectively in all state, municipal, and enterprise committees. Reports are made hurriedly at Party meetings in a superficial way because there is no collective work. The facts are not analyzed.

Reports are not stated homogeneously. They are more a summary of the facts than a report and are absorbed with current questions. The reports do not have the principal elements analysis and generalization. We know that this is more difficult, but it is valuable to establish a just and clear orientation on the basis of generalized experiences in order to indicate clear perspectives for the work of the Party.

The reports should have analysis and generalization, criticism and auto-criticism, and they should open perspectives for the continuity of Party work.

What does all this signify?

It signifies that we still do not understand the importance of the Party to the victory of the Brazilian revolution; it signifies that we do not understand that the Party is the only proven army to conduct our people to revolution. This is why the tasks of construction of the Party are not executed with the tenacity that they require.

The political tasks which we have for our goal demand new measures. Our successes in the struggle for the conquest of power will depend on the strength of the Party.

How may we confront this? A correct answer to this question embraces the whole work of construction of the Party. Few committees present measures for the completion of the Stalin Plan. The Metropolitan Committee has nothing to indicate what concrete measures it plans to take to achieve victory in the Stalin Plan, although there is every favorable condition for this. Others say that their plan is not good, but they do not say what they are going to do to improve it. Our theme should be the theme of the Bolshevik Party: resolutions must be executed.

To complete the Stalin Plan five measures are necessary:

1. Give more aid and control to the completion of the tasks of the Stalin

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Recruitment Plan.

2. Intensify the responsibility of every Communist toward Party affairs.
3. Elevate the will to work and the combativeness of all Party groups.
4. Improve the organizational work of the Party among the masses.
5. Increase the rate of execution of the tasks of the Party.

Let us examine each one of these measures:

1. More aid and more control is necessary in the bases of the Party. The control should be systematic and should be exercised by the most capable members of the directorates who should contact the bases more frequently and assist concretely on the political and ideological planes. This must be done in order that there may be no repetition of the incidents which occurred in the Prefecture of the Federal District and in the public transportation company of Sao Paulo, where there is little aid and control. We should examine why some cells grow and others stagnate and disappear. The example of the cell of the Light Company described here shows us that, where care is taken of the Party, the Party is strengthened. If some units of the Party do not grow but are weakened, it is because the tasks are not planned and not controlled. The plans established in all the units should be completed from the beginning to the end.
2. We must find new ways to elevate the capacity for initiative of all Party members. In connection with this, the observations made here by the comrade from the Light Company of Rio are just. It was because of them that we referred to the cell of the Light Company, which perhaps has suffered least of all the country from the illegality of the Party. It is necessary to establish some conditions for Communists without which the limits of the Party will remain undetermined. These statutory conditions should be observed, and the leaders of the Party should take care to see that this is done. To do otherwise is to confuse ourselves as a mass organization. The Party cannot be taken lightly, as something to be entered and left at will. It should be a fortress of the proletariat. Our principles should be observed. Each member of the Party is responsible for the whole Party, and the Party is responsible for each one of its members.
3. We must stimulate the will to work and the combativeness of the Party, particularly of the enterprise cells. The organizations of the Party should have their own life and initiative, and for this it is necessary to do the followings:
 - a. Make the cells understand their mission of being the vanguard and their tasks of connecting the working class to the units of the Party, and of winning the great masses to the political line of the Party. The cells should be attentive to the feelings of the masses. The cells should recruit new members for the Party and collect monthly contributions from all. The cells should organize political study and develop criticism and auto-criticism.
 - b. Educate the secretariats of the cells, to make them good leaders. This is the key to success.
 - c. Generalize and circulate the experiences of the cells. (For example, cite the cases of Standard, of the Light Company, and of Mocangue, which managed to multiply the number of their Party members and to connect them to the mass. They acted with audacity and without sectarianism in linking their groups with the masses. The secretariats of these cells met frequently, almost every day, and carried with great mobility their day by day tasks to all the cell members. They controlled the execution of the tasks and helped the comrades who had the least experience. Because of this, the Party multiplied its members in these enterprises and increased the circulation of Voz Operaria. In Mocangue

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they carried out partial paralyzations in protest against the imprisonment of a comrade by the reaction. This did not give the enemy the opportunity to react against the Party because there the Party is tied to the masses, and is organized into union councils in all sections of the enterprise.)

4. It is necessary to improve the work of the Party among the masses in order to organize them. Any task of the Party should reflect the interests of the masses. To do this the method of persuasion should be used with respect to the masses, because it is impossible to advance without convincing the masses, and it is impossible to convince them without demonstrating. Without this we shall not win the masses to the orientation of the Party.
5. It is necessary to increase the rate of work on the Stalin Recruitment Plan. We must work with tenacity, passion, and love. We must follow the example of the District Committee of Osasco in Sao Paulo, which in three months built the Party in all the enterprises. All the members of this District Committee contribute to the Party. Another positive example is found in the cities of Jundiai and Santos, Sao Paulo, where things were not going well. We must combat liberalism in the Party, personal and collective irresponsibility, and stagnation of the work. Where the tasks are not progressing, they must be stimulated. Stimulate in every way the initiative of the bases and the members.

In order to increase the rate of work we need a new work style. We must keep the fundamentals in constant view and remember that the construction of the Party must be concentrated in the large enterprises. Each Party group should have its policy of concentration, whether it be for the construction of the Party or to work in an organization of the masses. In short, it is necessary to give a revolutionary impulse to the Stalin Plan. Only thus may we reach the end of the plan with the stipulated tasks successfully completed.

Another important question which should preoccupy us is the question of the instability which may be noted in the directorates of the Party within the Federal District. It is necessary to combat this instability because it generates instability within the Party itself.

We do not understand that we must work collectively. We have a false idea that it is the individuals and not the groups of the Party which resolve everything. We must work well with the groups of the Party. We must work collectively in the directorates of the Party. We must adopt the method of criticism and auto-criticism so that, as we have seen in practice, it will not be necessary for us to make changes in the directorates.

Resolutions

To Be Included in the Stalin Recruitment Plan

1. Stimulate the recruitment of women in each district with special competition. The National Committee is establishing a special prize for the State Committee which recruits the most women and organizes the most feminine cells. The Metropolitan Committee will institute the "Zelia Magalhaes" prize.
2. Stimulate the recruitment of farmers and rural dwellers in the districts. The National Committee will give a mimeograph machine to the State Committee which recruits and organizes the greatest number of rural dwellers.
3. Include the sale of our newspapers (five copies of Voz Operaria for each member), and of our books and pamphlets, in the recruitment plans of all district committees and cells of the Party. Provide for the creation of libraries in the districts and in the cells and the creation of enterprise newspapers in the enterprises of more than 500 workers.
4. Make a part of district and enterprise cell plans the obligatory organization of union councils in the enterprises of more than 500 workers.
5. Encourage district committees and cells to hold courses of short duration and to create circles of study in the bases, particularly in the bases in the enterprises.

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6. Hold during the first part of December the Metropolitan Conference of cells of metallurgical enterprises of more than 400 workers.

Suggestions

1. Hold semi-monthly control meetings in each district.
2. Make a controlled check on recruitment an obligatory part of the order of the day at meetings of all Party groups until the end of the recruitment campaign.
3. Hold control meetings on the recruitment campaign in the enterprises of each district.
4. The Metropolitan Committee should hold, by 30 November, a control meeting on the recruitment campaign in the enterprises of more than 2,000 workers.
5. Organize and plan the propaganda of the Stalin Recruitment with registrations, banners, and handbills.

25X1A Comments.

1. The quota for the Federal District is 50,000 points, according to the point system set out in a previous report. In the Maritime Zone Committee, for example, 10,000 points correspond to 334 new recruits. On this basis it might be calculated that the Federal District has a quota of five times this figure, or 1,670 new recruits; however, it is not known whether recuperated former members were included in the Maritime Committee figures. Also, it is likely that the average recruit in the Federal District will have less point value than the average recruit in the maritime industry, since recruitment in the Federal District is general in nature and includes intellectuals, women, and youths. Thus it seems likely that the number of persons to be recruited in the Federal District is actually considerably more than 1,670.
2. This probably refers to the quota to be collected in the Campaign for Fifteen Million Cruzeiros.
3. Persons from higher Party units who attend meetings of lower units for purposes of guidance and control.

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